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Terrorism risks in climate-friendly electricity scenarios 
for Europe 
If Europe is to reach its long-term climate targets of 80-95% greenhouse gas emissions by 
2050, the power sector must be made almost entirely carbon neutral. Decarbonising the 
European power system with mainly domestic renewables and supporting this with imports of 
dispatchable solar power from North Africa, as foreseen in the Desertec concept, is one 
frequently proposed way to achieve this. 
However, Desertec also triggers concerns and numerous unanswered questions remain. One 
critical question is whether the long, largely unprotected import HVDC lines would be an 
attractive terrorist target and a threat to European security of electricity supply. Concerns that 
critical energy infrastructure, and especially electricity transmission lines, are “a dominant 
target for terrorist attacks” (Tranchita et al., 2009:246) are prominent in science, policy and 
industry alike. For example, the CEO of Bloomberg New Energy Finance stated: “I’m not sure 
we want to be dependent on North Africa for our electricity supply when anyone with a 
shoulder-launched missile can take out the electricity supply for Europe” (Morales, 2010). 
However, if Europe decides against Desertec, it must choose another pathway for its 
decarbonised electricity supply. Among the most feasible pillars for this appears to be to rely 
on natural gas for power generation and add carbon capture and storage (CCS). Considering 
the dwindling European gas reserves, this would likely require Europe to rely on gas from 
neighbouring, gas-rich countries – predominately in MENA and the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
– imported through long, unprotected pipelines or exposed terrorist targets like liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) terminals. Thus, at first sight, both these decarbonisation pathways have 
similar vulnerabilities. Here, I assess and compare the inherent terrorist attack vulnerabilities of 
an electricity import (Desertec, Trieb, 2006; Trieb et al., 2012) and a gas import-based CCS 
scenario (from the Global energy assessment (GEA) Johansson et al., 2012). 
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Typical terrorist targets are soft, or easy-to-attack, and high-profile targets, attacked with the 
aim to create fear – or terror – and affect an enemy audience wider than the population 
immediately affected by the attack. Successfully destroying energy infrastructure can 
potentially cause large economic damage and even disrupt the functioning of society and the 
state, making a terrorist-induced outages potentially very high-profile and fear-creating. 
Long, unprotected pipelines and HVDC lines are soft targets: if a terrorist group decides to 
destroy a single line, they have good prospects of succeeding, but this does not necessarily 
cause outages. For this, multiple attacks are necessary, but this is difficult and only few 
terrorist groups have the capacity for a large number of coordinated attacks. Thus, the number 
of successful attacks needed to overcome the buffers is estimated as a proxy for the softness 
of the infrastructure system. 
To fulfil the fear-creation criterion, however, the resulting outage must be large and, above all, 
sustained. Terrorist-induced outages have never happened in Europe, and are very rare in the 
world (especially outside Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan), but one cannot be sure that it 
remains this way. Future terrorists could see energy infrastructure as a symbol of their enemy, 
a large-scale attack is certainly possible (with no statement about probability) and the effects 
of a large and long outage would probably be fear-creating at a high level. If it is possible to 
cause severe outages, energy infrastructure could be attractive to terrorists. Thus, the 
potential outage size and length of various attack scenarios is a useful proxy both for the 
European vulnerability and the attractiveness for terrorists to attack energy infrastructure 
supplying Europe. 
For this, the scenarios are decomposed down to the infrastructure level, with each import 
chokepoint (HVDC import line, gas pipeline or LNG terminal) depicted separately. Whereas 
Desertec allows for this level of resolution, the GEA scenario is assumed to be served by the 
gas import and storage infrastructure existing today and in construction/planning for 2020. In a 
sensitivity analysis approach, I test whether the data is robust and the conclusions generic to 
the supply modes, or if they are only valid to the precise import configurations of Desertec and 
GEA. For this, the full span of possible import channels is tested: the Desertec HVDC lines are 
doubled (“min-case”) and halved (“max-case”) compared to what is proposed, and the GEA 
gas imports come either only by pipelines the size of the Brotherhood trunk line (“min-case”) or 
only by medium-sized LNG terminals (“max-case”). 
 
Introduction 
Terrorist target selection 
The results show that the inherent terrorist attack vulnerabilities of the import systems for 
electricity and gas are low, as the systems are both diversified and have considerable buffers.  
It is difficult to overcome the buffers and cause an outage at all: the buffers require terrorists to 
simultaneously disable at least 2 or 3 power lines if the aim is to cause a blackout, whereas 
between 5 (extremely conservative case) and over 100 gas import points must be disabled to 
overcome the immediate gas buffers, see Table 1. Therefore, although each single chokepoint 
is a soft target, the energy infrastructure system as a whole is not. 
 
Results 
Conclusion 
  Desertec GEA 
  
Max. Base Min. Max. Base Min. 
Peak demand 3 2 2 80 28 7 
Average demand 3 2 2 102 54 11 
Half response 3 2 2 40 13 5 
Double response 3 2 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
If the aim is to cause spectacular impacts which cannot be quickly remedied, a much larger 
number of simultaneous, successful attacks is required: achieving this would require the 
attackers to successfully carry out between 30 and 120 simultaneous attacks across a huge 
area, see Figures 1 and 2. Doing this is extremely difficult, so that the by far most likely impact 
of a reasonable-scale terrorist attack is negligible, or – for the large-number attack scenarios – 
short-lived and thus manageable. These unspectacular impacts of even spectacular, multiple  
attacks reduce the attractiveness of energy infrastructure as a terrorist target: a group capable 
of carrying out many simultaneous attacks may instead choose another target than the energy 
system. 
Table 1: Number of simultaneously disabled chokepoints required to overcome primary 
buffers. Source: Lilliestam (in review) 
Figure 2: Potential outage size and duration for the simultaneaous disabling of 5, 10 
and all (33 and 83, respectively) chokepoints for Desertec (left) and GEA (right). 
Source: Lilliestam (in review) 
Traditional, forceful attacks are highly unlikely to cause spectacular (i.e. very large and long-
lasting) outages and cause severe damage, as system functionality can be restored quickly in 
all but the most extreme attack scenarios. These however require a very large number, at least 
10 but in some variations over 100, of simultaneous, successful attacks. This is especially true 
for gas imports, due to the presence of storages, whereas electricity imports are slightly more 
vulnerable. Achieving this would be very challenging for a national army, and almost 
impossible for a terrorist group. As a consequence, the potential impacts for Europe, and 
hence its vulnerability, are low, and the attractiveness to attackers is also low. Thus, the 
terrorism risk of both electricity and gas imports is not a major concern for the decarbonisation 
policies of Europe. 
Figure 1: General structure of electricity (left) and gas (right) import 
channels. Sources: Desertec foundation, kbbnet.de,  
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